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excludible is the excess of actual over normal living
expenses.27  The amount of insurance proceeds excludible
from income cannot be determined until the end of the loss
period, with any excess includible in income for the taxable
year in which the loss period ends or, if later, the year the
excess is received.28
SPECIAL NOTE: The IRS has announced that in
flooded areas of the midwest returns due on or after June 30,
1993 may be filed without penalty by October 15, 1993.
Interest, however, will be due for the period of the delay.
Taxpayers should write in red “FLOOD DISASTER,
COUNTY OF _____” on the top of their returns. IR 93-62,
July 27, 1993.
Also, the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993
includesrelief provisions involving losses relating to
flooding. See p. 126-127 supra.
FOOTNOTES
1 E.g., I.R.C. § 1033(e) (sale and reinvestment of livestock held
for draft, dairy or breeding purposes).
2 E.g., I.R.C. § 451(d) (one-year deferral for crop insurance
proceeds and federal disaster assistance payments).
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-4(c).
4 I.R.C. § 451(d).  See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law §
27.03[7][a] (1993); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.02[4]
(1993).
5 I.R.C. § 451(d).  See Rev. Rul. 91-55, 1991-2 C.B. 784.
6 Notice 89-55, 1989-1 C.B. 696.
7 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6.
8 I.R.C. § 451(d).
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(a)(1).
10 Id.
11 Rev. Rul. 74-145, 1974-1 C.B. 113.  See Notice 89-55, 1989-1
C.B. 696.
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-6(b).
13 I.R.C. § 451(e).
14 H.R. 2735, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
15 I.R.C. § 1033(e).
16 See Rev. Rul. 79-263, 1979-2 C.B. 82; Notice 89-55, 1989-1
C.B. 696.
17 I.R.C. § 165.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(1).
18 Maduz v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1961-249.
19 Radding v. Comm’r, T.. Memo. 1988-250 (deduction limited to
repair costs in excess of insurance recovery).
20 Helstoski v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1990-382.
21 Id.  See Beyer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-313 (deduction
allowed for repairs because of storm damage; deduction not
allowed for diminution in value of beach front property).
22 I.R.C. § 165(a), (b).
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(2).
24 See I.R.C. § 165(a).
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-11(a), (b).
26 I.R.C. § 123(A).
27 I.R.C. § 123(b).
28 Rev. Rul. 93-43, I.R.B. 1993-24, 54.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
FENCES-ALM § 1.01[2].• The plaintiff was injured
when the plaintiff's truck struck a horse owned by the
defendant on an interstate highway. The highway was in a
“horse herd district” and the state highway department had
constructed a fence between the highway right-of-way and
the defendant’s land. The state was named as a defendant for
negligently failing to maintain the fence. The court held that
the state had no duty to maintain the fence under statute or
regulations and therefore could not be held liable for
negligent maintenance of the fence. Yager v. Deane, 853
P.2d 1214 (Mont. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors had claimed a rural
homestead as exempt in a Chapter 7 case. Prior to the
bankruptcy filing, a creditor obtained a judgment lien
against the debtors’ property. The debtors were denied a
discharge under Section 727 and filed for avoidance of the
judgment lien as impairing their homestead exemption. The
court held that the denial of discharge did not affect the
avoidance rights of the debtors for liens which impaired
exemptions. The court also held that the judgment lien was
not avoidable for impairing the homestead exemption
because, under Texas law, judgment liens do not attach to
property previously declared to be the debtor’s homestead;
therefore, the lien could not impair the homestead
exemption. In re Henderson, 155 B.R. 157 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1992).
The debtors owned two properties, a residence and a gas
station. The properties were subject to the same wrap-
around mortgage and had a fair market value of $11,000
more than the remaining amount on the mortgage. The
debtors claimed the entire equity amount as exempt. The
properties were also subject to a judicial lien for $10,000.
The court held that because the properties were both subject
to the same indebtedness, the two properties would be
combined for purposes of determining whether the debtors
had any equity in the properties. The court held that the
judicial lien would be avoided as impairing the debtors’
equity in the properties. An unexplained issue in the case is
what exemption was claimed as to the gas station property.
The debtors had claimed only a homestead exemption under
Section 522(d)(1) and the court did not discuss the
availability of that exemption for the gas station. A better
result would have been reached had the total equity been
allocated to the separate properties, based on relative fair
market values, and the judicial lien avoided to the extent it
impaired the allowable homestead exemption on the
residence. In re Frameli, 155 B.R. 354 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1993).
The debtor owned property with the nondebtor spouse as
tenants by the entirety and claimed an exemption in the
property to the extent of the debtor’s right to use and control
the property, the exemption allowed under Tennessee law.
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The debtor sought to avoid a judgment lien against the
properties, arguing that the lien impaired the right to use and
control the property because the property could be sold only
with the approval of the lienholder since the lien was
effective as to the debtor’s survivorship interest in the
property.  The court held that the lien could not be avoided
because the lien did not impair the debtor’s right to use and
control the property.  The ruling implies that the right to sell
property owned as tenants by the entirety is either not a right
eligible for the exemption or at least is not a part of the right
to use and control the property. In re Arango, 155 B.R. 465
(E.D. Tenn. 1993), aff’g, 136 B.R. 740 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1992).
    CHAPTER 12
AUTOMATIC STAY-ALM § 13.03[2].• The debtor
had originally filed a Chapter 11 case and a plan was
confirmed. The debtor defaulted on the plan and a secured
creditor began foreclosure of the debtor’s farm. The debtor
filed a Chapter 12 case to stop the foreclosure. The creditor
objected to the Chapter 12 filing as not in good faith and
because the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 12 since the
debtor had more than $1.5 million in debts. The creditor
obtained relief from the automatic stay to foreclose against
the farm and the court ruled that the debtor was not eligible
for Chapter 12. The debtor filed appeals of those rulings.
Within 30 minutes before the foreclosure sale was to
commence, the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, but the
creditor proceeded with the sale. The debtor subsequently
dismissed the appeals of the earlier rulings and sought to
avoid the foreclosure sale as violating the automatic stay of
the Chapter 11 filing. The court held that the automatic stay
was not violated because the Chapter 11 filing was
improper. Since the appeal of the Chapter 12 rulings
extended the existence of the Chapter 12 case, the Chapter
11 case was filed during an existing Chapter 12 case;
therefore, the Chapter 11 case was improper and void. In
addition, the court held that the Chapter 11 petition could
not be used to prevent the sale because the petition was not
filed in good faith since the only purpose of the filing was to
delay the foreclosure sale. The court did not award sanctions
against the debtor, reasoning that the debtor’s actions were
motivated only by desperation to retain the farm. Sanctions
were also not imposed on the debtor’s counsel because the
court felt that the counsel was only trying to help the debtor.
In re Cross Timbers Ranch, Inc., 155 B.R. 215 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION
AUTOMATIC STAY-ALM § 13.03[2].• After the
debtors had filed for bankruptcy, the IRS filed a tax lien
against the debtors’ homestead to secure a prepetition tax
claim.  The lien was filed without knowledge of the
bankruptcy filing.  However, after the IRS was notified of
the bankruptcy filing, the IRS negotiated the release of the
lien by requiring the debtors to deliver two refund checks
back to the IRS and to pay the remaining amount of the tax
claim from the proceeds of the sale of the homestead. The
debtors had claimed a homestead exemption. The court held
that although the initial filing of the tax lien was not a
willful violation of the automatic stay, the failure of the IRS
to release the lien without conditions after learning about the
bankruptcy filing was a willful violation of the stay. The
court ordered the IRS to release the lien and to satisfy the
remaining amount, over $7,000, of the tax claim in payment
of damages suffered by debtors.  In re Rhodes, 155 B.R.
491 (W.D. Ark. 1993), aff’d, 147 B.R. 492 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1992).
DEDUCTIONS-ALM § 13.03[7].•  The Chapter 7
trustee filed corporate income tax returns for the debtor
corporation which reported income and expenses on the
accrual method of accounting. The trustee filed amended
returns deducting expenses for accrued post-petition interest
on general unsecured claims filed in the case. The
corporation was insolvent throughout the bankruptcy case.
The IRS denied the deductions.  Under I.R.C. § 461, an
interest deduction would not be deductible under the accrual
method of accounting until the taxpayer became liable “in
all events” for the expense. The court held that the estate
would not be liable “in all events” for the post-petition
interest until the estate had paid all unsecured claims and
had property remaining to pay the interest. During the
taxable years of the bankruptcy case, the debtor was
insolvent so that no property would remain after payment of
all unsecured creditors; therefore, the interest claims did not
accrue during the bankruptcy case. In re West Texas
Marketing Corp., 155 B.R. 399 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
DISCHARGE. In April 1990 the IRS assessed the
debtor for 1982 through 1986 taxes.  The debtor filed a
Chapter 13 case in July 1990 which was voluntarily
dismissed in February 1991. The debtor refiled for Chapter
13 in April 1991 and sought discharge of the 1982 through
1986 taxes as assessed before 240 days before the filing for
bankruptcy.  The court held that the 240 day limitation
period was tolled during the first bankruptcy case and the
taxes were not dischargeable. In re Richards, 994 F.2d 763
(10th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 141 B.R. 751 (W.D. Okla. 1992).
POST-PETITION INTEREST. The debtor had filed a
Chapter 13 case which was dismissed after the debtor failed
to make plan payments. The IRS had filed three claims in
that case, a secured claim, a priority claim and an unsecured
claim. The debtor filed a second Chapter 13 case and the
IRS filed three claims of the same type but included interest
and penalties accrued during the first Chapter 13 case. The
court held that the interest and penalties were allowable but
needed to be reduced to reflect the debtor’s plan payments
on the secured claim. In re Kirnie, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,434 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. The debtor as an officer
and director of a cattle breeding corporation, was a signatory
on the corporation's checking accounts, and had the
authority to borrow money for the corporation and to hire
employees.  The debtor's duties, however, involved
primarily the management of the cattle breeding operation
and the debtor's brother, the sole shareholder, managed the
administration of the company, including payment of wages
and taxes. The Bankruptcy Court initially held that the
debtor was not a "responsible person" liable for the 100
percent penalty, under I.R.C. § 6672, for the failure of the
corporation to pay withheld employment taxes. That
decision was reversed by the District Court in an
unpublished opinion.  On remand the Bankruptcy Court held
that the IRS could assess the penalty in a lump sum and was
not required to assess the penalty on a quarterly basis. In re
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Taylor, 155 B.R. 543 (W.D. Okla. 1993), on rem. from
unrep. D. Ct. dec. rev’g and rem’g, 140 B.R. 294 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1992).
RETURNS-ALM § 13.03[7].• The Chapter 7 trustee
filed the debtor’s corporate income tax return for 1989 and
requested a prompt determination from the IRS under
Section 505(b). The IRS did not respond to the request
within 60 days but 84 days later assessed the estate for a
penalty for failure to pay estimated tax for 1989. The court
held that although the trustee and debtor would not be liable
for the penalty, the penalty would be allowed as a claim
against the estate. The court held that the estate was not a
“successor to the debtor;” therefore, the estate was not
relieved of liability by Section 505.  In re West Texas
Marketing Corp., 155 B.R. 399 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The plaintiff contracted with the defendant to
purchase male and female pairs of ostrich chicks. The
contract provided for the purchase of up to 10 pairs in 1988
at $1,500 per pair and up to 10 pairs in 1989 at the “going
market price.” The plaintiff attempted to purchase chicks in
1988 but the defendant was unable to sell any. After oral
negotiations, the plaintiff sent a letter reviewing the parties’
modification of the contract to have the 1988 chicks
delivered from the 1989 hatch. The letter was silent as to the
price but the plaintiff argued, and the trial court agreed, that
the term “1988 chicks” indicated that the 1988 price was to
apply. In 1989, the market price for ostrich chicks was
$6,000 per pair and the defendant refused to sell the plaintiff
any chicks at the contract price for 1988 chicks. The court
held that the letter was a modification of the contract and
that a breach of the contract did not occur until the
defendant refused to sell the chicks in 1989; therefore, the
damages were to be calculated based on the difference
between the 1989 market price and the 1988 contract price.
Dixon v. Roberts, 853 P.2d 235 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2][g].• The
debtor lost a farm on a foreclosure sale to the FmHA. While
the farm was in the FmHA inventory, the FmHA declared a
wetlands easement on more than half of the farm. The
FmHA sold the farm to the debtor at a price reduced to
reflect the loss of value from the wetlands easement. After
the debtor was unable to produce sufficient income from the
farm to meet the purchase payments, the debtor sought
removal of the wetlands easement as an unlawful cloud on
the title. The court held that the wetlands easement was
allowed under Executive Order 11990 which was not
prohibited by the subsequent Agricultural Credit Act of
1987 or the Food Security Act of 1985 which established the
lease/buyback program. The court also held that an issue of
fact remained as to whether the wetlands were in fact
wetlands when the FmHA acquired the property or were
changed to become wetlands while in the FmHA possession.
Harris v. U.S., 820 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Miss. 1992).
In a later hearing on the wetlands issue, the court upheld
the FmHA determination that the property was wetlands
based on a Fish and Wildlife Service survey of the property.
Harris v. U.S., 820 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Miss. 1993).
FEED GRAINS. The CCC has issued proposed
regulations establishing the acreage reduction for corn, grain
sorghum and barley at no more than 12.5 percent and for
oats at zero percent for 1994 crops. 58 Fed. Reg. 41643
(Aug. 5, 1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS. The FSIS has
issued interim regulations requiring safe handling
instructions on all raw meat and poultry product labeling,
including instructions on storage, cross-contamination,
cooking, and handling of leftovers. 58 Fed. Reg. 43478
(Aug. 16, 1993).
PEANUTS. The CCC has issued interim regulations
increasing to $2.00 per ton of peanuts the maximum
deduction from producer price support advances which may
be made by the Southwest area marketing association for
related activities of the association outside of the price
support program. 58 Fed. Reg. 41625 (Aug. 5, 1993).
     POULTRY. The APHIS has issued proposed regulations
making the following changes in the salmonella enteritidis
(SE) regulations: (1) exempting flocks from the testing
requirements if the flocks are participating in voluntary
testing; (2) removing testing blood and internal organs from
test flocks; (3) adding egg tests for study flocks; (4) addition
of requirements for trapping rodents; and (5) allowing SE-
positive houses and flocks to be released from regulation
only through depopulation, cleaning and disinfection, but
not through negative testing. 58 Fed. Reg. 41048 (Aug. 2,
1993).
SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS-ALM §
3.04.• The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has revised the
text, but not the result, of Caro-Galvan v. Curtis
Richardson, Inc., 981 F.2d 501 (11th Cir. 1993) , see p. 50
supra. Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d
1500 (11th Cir. 1993).
The plaintiffs were seasonal migrant farm workers who
harvested pickles on the defendant’s farm. The defendant
had the workers sign contracts as independent contractors to
harvest the pickles, although the workers were paid wages
when they worked at sorting, grading and packing the
pickles. The plaintiffs had no control over where to pick the
crop nor owned any equipment except for a few buckets.
The defendant had the right to fire the workers without
liability and controlled all aspects of planning, planting,
growing and harvesting the crop. The court held that the
workers were employees entitled to protections under the
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Agricultural Worker
Protection Act (now the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Workers Protection Act). Cavazos v. Foster, 822 F. Supp.
438 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].• The
taxpayer established a 20-year irrevocable charitable lead
trust with unencumbered property. The taxpayer’s son and
an independent trust company served as co-trustees. The
trust provided for annual payments of 6 percent of the net
fair market value of the trust assets to charitable
organizations as selected by the co-trustees each year,
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except that a beneficiary may not be an organization in
which the grantor served in a fiduciary capacity. The
remainder passed to the grantor’s descendants. The IRS
ruled that the trust was eligible for the charitable deduction
because (1) the power of the co-trustees to select the
charitable beneficiaries each year did not effect the
eligibility of the trust for the charitable deduction; (2) the
son’s serving as trustee did not effect the eligibility of the
trust for the charitable deduction; (3) the grantor would not
be treated as the owner of the trust. The IRS also ruled that
the trust would not be included in the grantor’s gross estate
because the grantor retained no power over the trust. Ltr.
Rul. 9331015, May 11, 1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].• Seven trusts for seven great-grandchildren were
created in 1957. The trusts had after-born great-
grandchildren clauses which resulted in seven subtrusts for
each of two great-grandchildren, born in 1958 and 1960.
Another 14 trusts were established for grandchildren and
their children, again with an after-born great-grandchildren
clause. When the 1960 great-grandchild was born, 14
subtrusts were created for that child. The trust consolidated
the subtrusts for each child into three trusts. The IRS ruled
that the consolidation would not subject the trusts to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9330031, May 4, 1993.
At the decedent’s death, the residuary estate passed to
two trusts for the surviving spouse, a marital trust and a non-
marital trust. The marital trust was QTIP and contained
enough property to decrease the decedent’s estate tax to
zero. The executors split the marital trust into two more
trusts, one remaining as a QTIP trust and the other becoming
a “reverse QTIP” trust. The IRS ruled that the split was
allowable. Ltr. Rul. 9331004, April 23, 1993.
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.• The decedent’s estate
included two limited partnership interests. The plaintiffs had
become responsible for the decedent’s affairs in 1979 and in
1983 entered into negotiations to sell the partnership
interests to the general partner. In the course of the
negotiations, the plaintiffs learned that the general partner
had been misappropriating partnership assets and filed suit.
After the decedent died, the suit was settled for over $3
million. The partnership assets attributable to the partnership
interests were valued at just over $1.2 million. The court
held that the decedent’s estate included the partnership
interests and the value of the claim against the general
partner even though some of the facts giving rise to the
claim did not become known until after the decedent's death.
The court held that the value of the partnership interests was
the value of the partnership property attributable to the
interests and the value of the settlement was the amount
received in the settlement above that amount. Rubenstein v.
U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,143 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT-ALM § 5.02[5].• The
trust was established by the decedent’s parents in 1966 and
became irrevocable upon the death of the decedent’s father
in 1974. Upon the death of the decedent’s mother in 1975,
the decedent received the net income of the trust and had a
testamentary power of appointment over the trust corpus,
except for two $15,000 specific bequests, to anyone except
the decedent, the decedent’s estate or the decedent’s
creditors. The decedent’s will exercised the power of
appointment to a trust for the decedent’s child and
grandchildren. The IRS ruled that the trust corpus was not
included in the decedent’s gross estate because the decedent
did not have a general power of appointment over the
property nor did the decedent create a general power of
appointment. The IRS also ruled that the trust was not
subject to GSTT because the decedent’s exercise of the
power of appointment to continue the trust did not extend
the trust more than 21 years after a life in being on the date
of the creation of the trust, the date the trust first became
irrevocable in 1974. Ltr. Rul. 9330008, April 22, 1993.
The taxpayer was a lifetime income beneficiary of a trust
established by the taxpayer’s deceased parent. The trust
provided the taxpayer with the right to receive one-fourth of
the trust corpus at age 35 and age 40 and with a testamentary
general power of appointment over trust corpus. The
taxpayer released the right to distributions of trust corpus
and partially released the power of appointment to limit the
power to appoint only to the taxpayer’s spouse and
descendants. The taxpayer’s will appoints the trust property
to the taxpayer’s descendants in trust for 21 years after the
death of the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the trust corpus
was not includible in the taxpayer’s gross estate, and
because the trust was irrevocable before 1985, the exercise
of the power of appointment would not subject the trust to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9330035, May 5, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CASUALTY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[2][a].•  The
taxpayer claimed a loss deduction for the taxable year in
which payment was received on a claim for damages to the
taxpayer’s automobile. The court held that because the
settlement was finalized in the previous taxable year, the
loss was finalized and became deductible in that year.
Bigoni v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-257.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].• The taxpayer was
allowed business loss deductions from a horse breeding and
racing activity where the taxpayer operated the business in a
businesslike manner by consulting experts and adjusting
business activities to meet changing circumstances. Arwood
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-352.
INFORMATION RETURNS . The taxpayer was a
trucking company which operated a fleet of trucks and
arranged for other companies or individuals to haul
agricultural commodities, primarily for a single client. The
taxpayer added a mark up to the charges submitted by the
other companies and individuals when the taxpayer
submitted the charges to the client. The IRS ruled that the
exception under Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a) for freight
charges was applicable to relieve the taxpayer of the
requirement to report payments of $600 or more to the
companies and individuals who hauled the commodities for
the client at the arrangement of the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul.
93290001, March 5, 1993.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04[1].• The
taxpayer was denied investment tax credit for expenses in
rehabilitating a building because the taxpayer used the
building as a personal residence and did not use the structure
in a trade or business. The taxpayer also had failed to obtain
certification of the building as a historical structure or
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demonstrate that an application had been made for
certification. Dennis v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-345.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.•
DEFINITION. In 1954, the taxpayer’s business was
incorporated. In 1982, the corporation’s state charter was
terminated for failure to pay state franchise taxes.  The
taxpayers continued to operate the business as a corporation,
the corporation did not terminate after the death of two
major shareholders and the business continued to identify
itself to the public as a corporation. The corporation filed
untimely corporate income tax forms for 1983 through 1989
then filed amended returns in an attempt to be taxed as a
partnership. The taxpayer argued that the loss of the charter
terminated the corporation. The court held that the business
had limited liability, free transferability of interests,
continuity of life and centralized management; therefore, for
federal income tax purposes, the business was a corporation.
Eleanore Builders, Inc. v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,426 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The taxpayers
formed a limited liability company (LLC). The IRS ruled
that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership because (1) the
LLC lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity of life
since the state LLC law and the LLC agreement required the
consent of all members to continue the partnership after a
terminating event, and (2) the LLC lacked the corporate
characteristic of transferability of interests because the Act
and agreement provided that if any other member objected
to the sale or assignment of a member’s interest in the LLC,
the transferee or assignee had no right to participate in the
management of the LLC. The IRS also ruled that, assuming
the LLC was not an investment company under I.R.C. § 351,
(1) no gain was recognized from the formation of the LLC,
and (2) the basis of an interest in the LLC was the amount of
money and the adjusted basis, in the hands of the member
just before contribution, of property contributed to the LLC
by a member. Ltr. Rul. 9331010, May 5, 1993.
PENALTIES. The IRS has extended to taxpayers filing
on 1992 returns for short taxable years beginning in 1993
the application of Rev. Rul. 92-23, 1992-1 C.B. 737 which
identified the circumstances under which the disclosure on a
taxpayer’s return of a position with respect to an item is
adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement of
income tax and return preparer penalties. Rev. Proc. 93-33,
I.R.B. 1993-28.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in July 1993,
the weighted average is 7.79 percent with the permissible
range of 7.01 to 8.57 percent for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 93-
39, I.R.B. 1993-26, 10.
RESPONSIBLE PERSON . The debtor was the
president of a corporation which failed to pay several
quarters of federal employment withholding taxes. The
plaintiff discovered that the taxes were not paid after an
investigation into the accounts handled by the plaintiff's
brother, the secretary-treasurer of the corporation. The
plaintiff consulted with an accountant and the IRS which
agreed not to pursue the I.R.C. § 6672 responsible person
penalty against the plaintiff and the plaintiff agreed to make
installment payments on the taxes owed. The IRS agreement
was sanctioned by a supervisor. The IRS continued to not
pursue the plaintiff and accepted installment payments until
the plaintiff and the corporation filed for bankruptcy. The
court held that the plaintiff was a responsible person who
had willfully failed to pay federal employment withholding
taxes but that the IRS was estopped from assessing the
penalty because of the plaintiff’s reliance on the IRS’s
agreement not to pursue the plaintiff as a responsible person.
In re Mando, 154 B.R. 953 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1993).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].•
ONE CLASS OF STOCK.  The shareholders of an S
corporation established a fund organized as a limited
liability company. The fund was funded with a portion of
each shareholder’s dividends. The fund served as a savings
and investment vehicle for each shareholder and as a fund to
indemnify surety companies providing construction bond
services for the S corporation. The IRS ruled that the fund
did not create a second class of stock because the fund did
not alter the shareholders’ right to distribution and
liquidation proceeds. Ltr. Rul. 9330009, April 29, 1993.
An S corporation entered into a split-dollar life insurance
agreement with its shareholders. Under the agreement, the
corporation paid the premiums on life insurance policies
purchased and owned by the shareholders, and the
shareholders agreed to reimburse the corporation to the
extent the payment of the premiums conferred an economic
benefit on the shareholders. The IRS ruled that the
agreement did not create a second class of stock because the
agreement did not alter the shareholders’ right to distribution
and liquidation proceeds. Ltr. Rul. 9331009, May 5, 1993.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
September 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.91 3.87 3.85 3.84
110% AFR 4.31 4.26 4.24 4.22
120% AFR 4.69 4.64 4.61 4.60
Mid-term
AFR 5.35 5.28 5.25 5.22
110% AFR 5.89 5.81 5.77 5.74
120% AFR 6.44 6.34 6.29 6.26
Long-term
AFR 6.28 6.18 6.13 6.10
110% AFR 6.92 6.80 6.74 6.71
120% AFR 7.56 7.42 7.35 7.31
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a member of
a partnership accounting business. The taxpayer was
required by the partnership agreement to pay, without
reimbursement, local automobile expenses incurred in the
partnership business. The taxpayer also claimed that the
partnership required the taxpayer’s membership in various
clubs to foster new business and to meet with clients. The
partnership reimbursed the taxpayer for the dues involved
but claimed the reimbursements as a guaranteed payment
under I.R.C. § 707(c). The IRS ruled that the expenses were
deductible from gross income by the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul.
9330001, April 13, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9330004, April 14,
1993.
STRADDLES. The taxpayer was a company which
made a large number of mixed straddles. Early in 1992, the
company hired a new management team, including a tax
director. Because of a large number of other pressing tax
issues, the director did not seek to make an election to use a
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mixed straddle account under Treas. Reg. § 1.1092(b)-
4T(f)(1) until six months after the due date. The IRS ruled
that reasonable cause existed for the taxpayer’s failure to
timely make the election and allowed an extension to file the
election. Ltr. Rul. 9331011, May 5, 1993.
UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME. The plaintiff
was an exempt  nonprofit organization which owned six
farms leased on a 50 percent crop share basis. The plaintiff
was responsible for payment of property taxes and 50
percent of fertilizer, herbicide, pesticide and seed costs. The
tenants were responsible for the other costs, including the
harvesting costs. The parties agreed that the crop share rent
was unrelated business income and that I.R.C. §
512(b)(3)(B)(i) would exclude rent from real property from
the tax on unrelated business income. The IRS argued that
the exception, under I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(B)(ii), to the
exclusion caused the income to be taxable as net income
from a business because the plaintiff’s net income from the
farms depended on the amount of expenses which changed
from year to year. The court held that under a crop share
lease, the rental income was a fixed percentage of the gross
receipts of the harvest and excludible from income under the
parenthetical exception in I.R.C. § 512(b)(3)(B)(ii). In
reaching its holding, the court noted that the net income of
the plaintiff from the farms differed from the net income of
the tenants in that each party had a different set of expenses;
therefore, the plaintiff’s rental income was not dependent
upon the net income of each farm as a business unit, but was
dependent upon the plaintiff’s individual expenses.
Independent Order of Odd Fellows Grand Lodge of
Iowa v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,448 (S.D.
Iowa 1993).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
REASONABLE USE. The state had initiated an
adjudication of water rights for the Marshall Lake basin
from which the defendants withdrew water for irrigation.
The defendant submitted a claim for water use based on a
history of water use dating back to 1906. However, the
defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence of the
amount of water used to irrigate 73 acres of alfalfa. The
court upheld the referee allowance of 1.5 c.f.s. of
instantaneous flow based upon a Washington State
University Research Bulletin irrigation report which
identified the amount of water needed to irrigate an acre of
alfalfa on land in the area of the defendants. The court
denied the defendant’s request for additional water use
because the irrigation system required 3 cubic feet of water
running through the system to produce 1 cubic feet of usable
irrigation water. The court held that the irrigation system
was too wasteful and that water rights could not be based on
wasted water used.  State Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852
P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONVERSION. Two landlords of the same tenant filed
an action for conversion and eloignment [removal for a
distance] against the purchaser of hay from the tenant,
claiming perfected landlords’ liens on the hay. The
purchaser argued that the action was barred by Wash. Rev.
Code § 60.11.130 because the action was not brought within
24 months after the date of default by the tenant. The court
held that the statute applied to foreclosure actions and not to
conversion and eloignment actions. However, the court also
held that the foreclosure limitation was relevant in that if the
foreclosure action was timely brought, the liens would not
expire. The court found that the foreclosure action had been
timely brought. The purchaser also argued that the landlords
had waived the security interest in allowing hay to be sold
after the tenant’s default. The court noted that some
evidence was presented that the landlord had received
advice from counsel to not contact potential hay buyers
about the lien; therefore, an issue of fact remained as to
whether the landlord’s conduct waived the security interest.
The court also held that the purchaser was not liable for
conversion for hay purchased before the landlord’s lien was
filed. Michel v. Melgren, 853 P.2d 940 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993).
A creditor had supplied fertilizer and other chemicals to
the defendant for use in raising grass seed. The creditor filed
a notice of lien with the Secretary of State and sent written
notices of the lien to the defendant and several possible seed
buyers, but not the company to whom the defendant sold the
seed crop. The creditor sought to recover the proceeds of the
crop from the buyer based upon its perfected lien. The filing
statute, Or. Rev. Stat. § 87.332, only required written notice
to the debtor and other known lien holders; therefore, the
court held that the buyer was not entitled to a written notice
and was liable for the conversion of the seed crop. Green
Valley Industries, Inc. v. Keech, 858 P.2d 318 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993).
FRAUD. The defendants had borrowed operating funds
from the plaintiff to the limit of the plaintiff’s lending
capability. In order to increase the defendant’s loans, the
plaintiff sought an FmHA guarantee of the original loan.
When the guarantee was obtained, the plaintiff did not take
the original loan off its books until a second loan was made
to the defendant and the original loan was marked
“renewed.” The defendant sought discharge of the
guaranteed loan, under N.D. Cent. Code § 41-03-44(2),
alleging that the plaintiff fraudulently altered the loan
instrument. The court held that sufficient evidence was
presented to support the holding that no fraudulent alteration
of the guaranteed loan occurred. Sargent County Bank v.
Wentworth, 500 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1993). .
REPOSSESSION. Just prior to the debtor’s filing for
bankruptcy, the secured creditor obtained a state court order
for replevin of farm equipment serving as collateral for a
defaulted loan. The creditor also obtained relief from the
automatic stay to sell the collateral. The creditor failed to
give the debtor written notice of the sale as required by Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 400.9-504(3) and the debtor sought
disallowance of the creditor’s claim for the deficiency on the
loan after application of the collateral proceeds. The debtor
somehow received notice of the sale and was present. The
court held that the written notice requirement is strictly
enforced in Missouri courts, even when the debtor has other
actual notice of the sale, and held that the creditor’s claim
for the deficiency was disallowed. In re Hull, 155 B.R. 515






EXCEPTION. The plaintiff sought an exception to the
zoning of their dairy farm as agricultural-residential in
order to develop the land for single family residences. The
court upheld the Zoning Hearing Board’s ruling that an
exception was not warranted because (1) the land had been
used and was suitable for dairy farming, (2) there were no
localized wet or rocky conditions adverse to agricultural
use, (3) the adjacent land uses were not inconsistent with
agricultural use of the land, (4) the plaintiff failed to
provide tests or other evidence that the sites were suitable
for on-site sewage disposal. Henley v. Zoning Hearing
Bd., 625 A.2d 132 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Hall v. U.S., 822 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Tenn. 1992)
(marital deduction) see p. 97 supra.
CF Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 995 F.2d 101 (7th
Cir. 1993), aff’g and modifying, T.C. Memo. 1991-568
(cooperatives) see p. 98 supra.
Est. of Whittle v. Comm’r, 994 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.
1993), aff’g, 97 T.C. 362 (1991) (credit for prior transfers)
see p. 112  supra.
McLennan v. U.S., 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
aff’g, 23 Cls. Ct. 99 (1991) and 24 Cls. Ct. 102 (1991)
(charitable deduction) see p. 106 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
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